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Note
FEMALE INFERTILITY IN THE WORKPLACE: UNDERSTANDING THE
SCOPE OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT
JEANNE HAYES
Pregnancy discrimination was once used to marginalize female
workers. Today, infertility discrimination is used in much the same way.
Employers often refuse to accommodate infertile women who request time
off to undergo fertility treatments, forcing them to choose between family
and work. Employers have even terminated infertile women because of
their potential to strain company resources over a prolonged period of
time. In addition, employer-funded health plans rarely provide coverage
for fertility treatments, leaving infertile working women at a disadvantage
compared to their pregnant counterparts. The Pregnancy Discrimination
Act expanded Title VII’s definition of sex discrimination to include
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions, but it did not define “related medical conditions.” This Note
argues that infertility is a medical condition related to pregnancy for the
purposes of the PDA and advocates that Congress clarify that
sex discrimination includes infertility discrimination.
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FEMALE INFERTILITY IN THE WORKPLACE: UNDERSTANDING THE
SCOPE OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT
JEANNE HAYES*
I’m hurt, hurt and humiliated beyond endurance, seeing the crops
ripen, the fountains give water endlessly, the ewes bear scores of lambs,
and the bitches pups, till the whole countryside seems to rise up and show
me its tender sleeping young, while I feel two hammer-blows here, instead
of a child’s mouth.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1987, NBC correspondent Maria Shriver called childlessness “The
Curse of the Career Woman.”2 Shriver was acknowledging a prominent
social trend that persists today. Women intent on advancing their careers
are increasingly waiting until later in life to have children.3 But postponing
childbearing adversely affects female fertility. A woman aged thirty-five
to forty-four is twice as likely to be infertile as is a woman aged thirty to
thirty-four.4 Even at the relatively young age of thirty, up to ninety percent
of a woman’s eggs are gone.5
There are now more women in the workforce battling infertility than
ever before.6 Today, approximately 6.1 million women of childbearing age
*
J.D. Candidate, University of Connecticut School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Peter
Siegelman, Roger Sherman Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut School of Law, for his
suggestions, and most importantly, his criticisms. I would also like to thank Drew Barber for
encouraging me to submit this Note. Finally, thank you to my parents, Helen and Lawrence Hayes, for
always giving me the freedom to think outside the box.
1
FEDERICO GARCÍA LORCA, YERMA, act II, sc. 2. (A.S. Kline trans., 2007) (1934).
2
SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH 104–05 (1991). See also SANDRA FREDMAN, WOMEN AND THE
LAW 127 (1997) (noting that after World War II, childless women were increasingly able to penetrate
traditionally male occupations, while women with children remained in “positions of disadvantage”).
3
See Leslie Sowers, Wanted: A Child of Our Own, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 25, 1996, at 1
(describing the problems inherent in the trend toward later childbearing); see also FREDMAN, supra
note 2, at 180 (discussing why women are delaying childbearing, namely, the “deepening gulf between
the labour market position of women with children and those without”); U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Changes in Women’s Labor Force Participation in the 20th Century, THE EDITOR’S DESK,
Feb. 16, 2000, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/print.pl/opub/ted/2000/Feb/wk3/art03.htm (showing the
increase in female labor force participation from 1950 to 1998).
4
Sowers, supra note 3.
5
Roger Fortuna & Suzan Clarke, For Women Who Want Kids, ‘The Sooner the Better’: 90
Percent of Eggs Gone by Age 30, ABC NEWS, Jan. 29, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/OnCall/
women-fertility-falls-lose-90-percent-eggs-30/story?id=9693015.
6
The increased number of women in the workforce battling infertility is attributable to their
increased participation in the workforce, not increased incidences of infertility. See also ETHEL
SLOANE, BIOLOGY OF WOMEN 390 (1985) (noting one study that suggested women should devote their
twenties to childbearing and their thirties to career development in order to prevent age-related
infertility).
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are battling infertility; of these, almost seventy percent are in the
workforce.7 The number of infertile women in the workforce is expected
to increase: female labor force participation is anticipated to climb to over
seventy-five percent by 2020.8
Twenty percent of infertile women will undergo time-consuming and
costly fertility treatments that are generally much more burdensome for
women than men.9 But this decision creates new professional and
economic problems.
First, employers have fired or refused to
accommodate women requesting time off for time-consuming fertility
treatments.10 Second, even if women receive the necessary time off,
employer-funded health plans rarely provide coverage for the costly
treatments.11
These problems are acute, even thirty years after passage of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”).12 The PDA amended Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit sex discrimination “because of or
on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”13
Thus, the threshold question is “[w]hether the PDA’s prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and ‘related medical conditions’
extends to discrimination on the basis of infertility.”14 This Note posits
that it does.
To date, the only U.S. Courts of Appeals to have considered this
questionthe Second, Eighth, and Seventh Circuitsagree that the PDA

7
OFFICE ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INFERTILITY (2009),
available at http://www.womenshealth.gov/faq/infertility.pdf. The most illustrative labor force
participation statistics available for female workers of childbearing age reveals that in 2005,
approximately 69.26% of females aged 16–44 participated in the labor force. Abraham Mosisa &
Steven Hipple, Trends in Labor Force Participation in the United States, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct.
2006, at 35, 40, 46.
8
See OFFICE ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, supra note 7. The projected 2020 mean labor force
participation rate for women aged 16–44 is approximately 76.5%. Mitra Toossi, A Century of Change:
The U.S. Labor Force 1950–2050, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 2002, at 15, 22.
9
Becky Ham, Money Matters when Choosing Fertility Treatments, Study Finds, HEALTH BEHAV.
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 22, 2006.
10
See Hall v. Nalco Co. (Nalco II), 534 F.3d 644, 645–46 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the
plaintiff stated a cognizable claim of pregnancy discrimination because she was terminated for
undergoing fertility treatments after being told she could not take time off); LaPorta v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 760, 771 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (holding that an employer’s refusal to
accommodate a woman’s request to take time off to undergo fertility treatments did not constitute
discrimination); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1402–03 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding
that an employer unlawfully terminated a woman undergoing fertility treatments).
11
See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 193−96 (2006) (describing the
lack of legislation requiring employer-funded health insurance coverage for fertility treatments).
12
Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(2006)).
13
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (emphasis added).
14
Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 2003).
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does not prohibit employment decisions based on infertility.
The
holdings of the Second16 and Eighth17 Circuits are premised on dicta from a
U.S. Supreme Court decision, United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls,
which suggests that classifications based on fertilityand by like
implication, infertilitydo not constitute sex discrimination because both
men and women can be fertile or infertile.18
In July 2008, the Seventh Circuit similarly held that the PDA does not
cover infertility. But the Seventh Circuit diverged from the Eighth and
Second Circuits by engaging in a novel, albeit problematic, analysis.19 In
Hall v. Nalco (“Nalco II”), the Seventh Circuit held that plaintiffs could
seek protection under the PDA for discrimination based on gender-specific
fertility treatments, but not for discrimination based on gender-neutral
infertility.20 The court found that assisted reproductive technologies, such
as in-vitro fertilization (“IVF”), require surgical impregnation that will
always affect women, not men, thus making them gender-specific, not
gender-neutral.21
The Seventh Circuit’s decision swung the pendulum closer to
recognizing infertile females as a protected class, but regrettably stopped
short.22 Nalco II limits protection to only those infertile women who are
actively getting fertility treatment; infertile women who have not yet
received treatment are outside the scope of protection. Under Nalco II, an
infertile woman who reveals her intention to become pregnant, but not the
specific nature of her fertility treatments, can still be fired. In addition,
under Nalco II, an employer is still under no obligation to provide
coverage for infertility, even if it provides an otherwise inclusive health
benefit plan.23 So long as infertility is considered gender-neutral, an
employer’s health plan excluding coverage for infertility is legal.
15
See Nalco II, 534 F.3d at 648−49 (holding that discrimination based solely on infertility, and
not infertility treatments, is not protected by the PDA); Saks, 316 F.3d at 348−49 (holding that
infertility is a gender-neutral condition and therefore falls outside the scope of protections afforded by
the PDA); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1996) (same).
16
Saks, 316 F.3d at 348.
17
Krauel, 95 F.3d at 680.
18
See United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991) (“Johnson
Controls’ policy [violates Title VII because it] classifies on the basis of gender and childbearing
capacity, rather than fertility alone.”).
19
See Nalco II, 534 F.3d at 648 n.1 (acknowledging that the court’s holding rested on an analysis
different from that of Krauel).
20
Id. at 648−49.
21
Id.
22
See id. at 648, 648 n.1 (declining to disagree with the Court’s holding in Johnson Controls that
infertility is not covered by the PDA because it is a gender-neutral condition).
23
It is discriminatory to exclude pregnancy coverage from an otherwise inclusive insurance plan
because pregnancy is related to sex for purposes of the PDA. In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Supreme Court
accepted the cost-justifications of the defendant employer and upheld the constitutionality of excluding
pregnancy coverage under California’s disability insurance plan. 417 U.S. 484, 496, 496 n.20 (1974).
The Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert relied on Geduldig and found that an exclusion of
pregnancy from a disability benefits plan providing general coverage was not gender-based
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Part II of this Note explains the physical, psychological, and economic
costs of infertility, as well as its relationship to the workplace, paying
attention to the disproportionate burdens placed on women, as opposed to
men. Part III details the legislative history of Title VII and the PDA,
particularly as it relates to infertility. Part IV addresses the significance of
Johnson Controls and the contrasting circuit court decisions, including
Nalco II, and focuses on the arguments both for and against recognition of
infertility under the PDA. Part V argues that Nalco II is but a small victory
for patients undergoing fertility treatments and provides an incomplete
solution for infertile women because it does not require employers to offer
insurance coverage for infertility. Part VI advocates for Congress to
clarify that the PDA unequivocally protects infertility, in addition to
women undergoing fertility treatments. Until then, Part VII offers practical
advice to working women navigating infertility in the workplace.
II. THE PROBLEM OF INFERTILITY
A. Infertility as a Medical Problem
Although a medical analysis of infertility is outside the scope of this
Note, some background information is necessary to understand the special
challenges that infertile women face. Each year in the United States, 6.1
million women, or roughly ten percent of women of childbearing age,
battle infertility.24 The medical definition of infertility is a “failure to
achieve pregnancy during one year of frequent, unprotected intercourse.”25
Doctors can determine the cause of infertility in eighty percent of
couples.26 In those cases, female factors cause approximately one-third of

discrimination. 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976). Thereafter, the PDA clarified that pregnancy was related to
sex and that it was therefore illegal to treat pregnancy-related conditions differently from other medical
conditions in a benefit plan. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006). See also Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 677–78 (1983) (describing this evolution in discrimination law).
24
For the purpose of this statistic, “childbearing age” includes only women aged 15–44. See
OFFICE ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, supra note 7.
25
Alaina B. Jose-Miller et al., Infertility, 75 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 849, 849 (2007). Despite this
definition, many states have their own statutory definitions of infertility. For example, New Jersey
defines infertility as follows:
[T]he disease or condition that results in the abnormal function of the reproductive
system such that a person is not able to: impregnate another person; conceive after
two years of unprotected intercourse if the female partner is under 35 years of age,
or one year of unprotected intercourse if the female partner is 35 years of age or
older or one of the partners is considered medically sterile; or carry a pregnancy to
live birth.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6x (West 2008). Connecticut defines infertility as “the condition of a
presumably healthy individual who is unable to conceive or produce conception or sustain a successful
pregnancy during a one-year period.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-536 (2007).
26
ACCESS: Australia’s National Infertility Network, About Infertility, http://www.access.org.au/
about_infertility (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
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infertility and male factors cause one-third of infertility. The remaining
one-third of infertility is caused by a combination of male and female
factors.28 Female factors that cause infertility include increased age, tubal
dysfunction,
uterine
abnormality,
irregular
ovulation,
and
hypothyroidism.29 Male factors that cause infertility include increased age,
testicular dysfunction, low sperm vitality or production, irregular hormone
levels, and ejaculation problems.30
Although infertility has long been a problem,31 advanced treatment
options have only recently become available. Medical treatment of
infertility involves the administration of medication, surgical procedures,
or both.32 Although infertility is caused equally by male and female
factors, treatments are often more grueling for women (even if the cause is
male-factor infertility), and are not always successful.33 Women must
often commit a larger amount of time to treatments and suffer more side
effects than men.34 This creates asymmetry in the world of infertility:
while both men and women experience infertility, women bear the brunt of
time-consuming and costly treatments.
For example, physicians often start the battle against infertility by
prescribing an oral medication such as Clomid, which stimulates follicle
hormones, for the female partner.35 Even then, doctors often require
women to make frequent visits to hospitals to monitor follicular
development via ultrasound.36 If a patient fails to become pregnant,
physicians then typically recommend intrauterine insemination (“IUI”) in
which a doctor introduces sperm into the female uterus via a catheter (i.e.,
fertilization occurs inside the body).37 If IUI and other methods fail to
achieve pregnancy, then doctors may recommend that a woman undergo

27

OFFICE ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, supra note 7.
Id.
29
Id.
30
Cindy Pan, Sussing Out the Swimmers, SUNDAY MAIL (Austl.), Sept. 7, 2008, at 6.
31
The Book of Genesis describes the plight of Abraham’s infertile wife, Sarah. So desperate for a
child was she that she sent her husband to sleep with her handmaiden. Genesis 16:1–2 (King James).
See also DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE
COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 6–13 (2006) (describing the long history of female infertility).
32
See JACQUELINE TOMLINS, THE INFERTILITY HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO MAKING BABIES
100−04 (2004).
33
The success rate for one round of fertility treatments is only about twenty-eight percent. CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2005 ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 6 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ART/
ART2005/508PDF/2005ART508.pdf. In 2005, of the 134,260 assisted reproductive technology
fertility treatments, there were 38,910 live births. Id. at 11.
34
See TOMLINS, supra note 32, at 102.
35
Jose-Miller et al., supra note 25, at 850.
36
DukeHealth.org, Care Guides: Fertility, Clomid, http://www.dukehealth.org/health_library/
care_guides/fertility/medications/clomid (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
37
RESOLVE: The National Fertility Association, Intrauterine Insemination, http://www.resolve.
org/site/PageServer?pagename=lrn_wamo_IUI (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
28
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IVF, a procedure in which an egg is fertilized outside of the body and then
implanted into the woman’s uterus.38
In fact, it was the emergence of IVF in the mid-to-late twentieth
century that brought infertility out of the closet and into the public
consciousness.39 In 1978, the same year as the passage of the PDA, the
first IVF child, Baby Louise, was born in Britain.40 Louise’s mother had
been unable to conceive naturally, so doctors collected her eggs, fertilized
them with her husband’s sperm in an artificial environment, and implanted
the fertilized egg back into her uterus.41 This same procedure would be
performed for the first time in the United States just three years later.42 As
one commentator noted, this “‘miracle of science’ has become just another
technique in the medical arsenal.”43 According to Stephanie Greco,
Director of Communications for RESOLVE, the National Infertility
Association, IVF has raised infertility “awareness, so people are beginning
to feel it’s O.K. to get help, rather than to feel totally isolated and
helpless.”44
While IVF can produce miracles, it is grueling for women, both
physically and emotionally. IVF requires the female patient to have
numerous pelvic exams and to take ovary-stimulating drugs via painful
injections that often cause mood swings.45 Almost daily, the female patient
must have blood drawn to monitor hormone levels.46 Ultrasound
examinations must frequently be performed on the female’s eggs.47 The
procedures must often be done on a moment’s notice, leaving little
opportunity for advance planning and causing strain on women with work
commitments.48 A typical timeline for a woman undergoing IVF is as
follows:

38
JOHN YEH & MOLLY ULINE YEH, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INFERTILITY 62 (1991); Saul Spigel,
Infertility: Causes, Treatment, Insurance and Disability Status (Conn. Gen. Assembly Office of
Legislative Research Report No. 2005-R-0145, 2005), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/rpt/
2005-R-0145.htm.
39
Laurie Tarkan, Fertility Clinics Begin To Address Mental Health, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2002, at
F5.
40
MARCIA MOBILIA BOUMIL, LAW, ETHICS AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 1 (1994).
41
Id.
42
PBS, Test Tube Babies Timeline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/
timeline/babies/2/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
43
Sowers, supra note 3.
44
Tarkan, supra note 39.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
In one case, doctors informed the patient on a Friday that she was ready for egg retrieval that
had to occur on Monday. The patient advised her employer that she needed that day off, but her
employer refused because a replacement could not be found on such short notice. LaPorta v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762 (W.D. Mich. 2001).
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Day 1: First day of menses
Day 2: Start of ovulation induction
Day 6: Start of monitoring for estrogen levels and follicular
growth until ideal levels are obtained
36 Hours After Ideal Follicular Growth Levels Are Obtained:
Follicles retrieved from female and sperm obtained from
male; fertilization of eggs outside uterus
48 Hours After Oocyte Retrieval: Transfer of embryos to
female
Next Two Days: Bed rest[49]
2 Weeks After Oocyte Retrieval: Pregnancy test50
An IVF cycle is successful only twenty-five percent of the time; more
often than not, a woman must undergo subsequent rounds of IVF treatment
to achieve pregnancy in order to become pregnant.51
The time-consuming procedures and often discouraging results can
take a significant psychological toll on women. Dr. Nada Stotland,
Professor of Psychiatry at Rush Medical College in Chicago, notes that
“women regard infertility as the most disastrous thing that’s ever happened
to them.”52 One woman who was required to undergo many medical
procedures, even though it was her husband who was infertile, explained
her resentment: “I felt like he had the cancer and I was taking the
chemo.”53 Because of the stressful nature of fertility treatments, many
fertility clinics have now begun to address the mental health of their female
patients.54 Even though stress alone does not cause female infertility, it
can trigger irregular menstruation, thereby creating a vicious cycle of stress
and infertility.55
Many couples exhaust their savings or go into debt to pay for these
expensive treatments, and often treatments must be tried again.56 Because
49
Sue Shellenbarger, Women Battling Infertility Find a Friend in the Court, WALL ST. J., Aug.
13, 2008, at D1.
50
YEH & YEH, supra note 38, at 62.
51
See Spigel, supra note 38.
52
Tarkan, supra note 39.
53
Sowers, supra note 3.
54
See Tarkan, supra note 39 (describing Boston IVF’s Mind/Body Center for Women’s Health,
which opened in 2002 and teaches women stress management and other ways of coping with the
emotional issues of infertility).
55
Randi Hutter Epstein, A Low-Tech Approach to Fertility: Just Relax, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,
2007, at F6.
56
See Tarkan, supra note 39 (describing that the high cost of IVF means that some couples must
choose between one cycle of IVF or adoption). In 1998, Rochelle Saks and her husband went into debt
after they discovered her employer would not cover her $10,000 fertility treatments. Jane Gross, The
Fight To Cover Infertility; Suit Says Employer’s Refusal To Pay Is a Form of Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
1998, at B1.
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there are no reporting requirements, the exact cost of fertility treatments is
unknown.57 The American Society of Reproductive Medicine estimates
that one round of IUI can cost anywhere from $275 to $2457, and one
round of IVF costs in excess of $12,000.58
The scope of insurance coverage varies considerably among states, as
does the definition of infertility.59 Infertility laws generally fall into one of
two groups: a “mandate to cover” or a “mandate to offer.” A mandate to
cover requires that insurance companies provide coverage for infertility
treatments as a benefit included in every policy.60 Only ten states mandate
coverage for fertility treatments.61 In those states, an employee must meet
certain requirements to qualify for coverage. Examples of qualifying
requirements include the following: (1) the fertilization attempt must be
made with the spouse’s sperm;62 and (2) the patient must have used all
reasonable, less expensive, and medically appropriate treatments before
IVF.63 This second requirement has the consequence of encouraging
women to undergo less effective treatment, so long as it is reasonable,
merely because it is covered under their insurance plans.64 Some states
that provide coverage for infertility treatments specifically exclude IVF.
New York, for example, requires insurers to provide coverage for
infertility drugs so long as they typically provide coverage for prescription
drugs, but does not require coverage for more expensive procedures such
as IVF.65 Other states impose lifetime limits; Illinois, for example, limits
coverage for egg retrievals to four attempts.66 These limits greatly reduce
the value of infertility laws. The ABC morning show The View ran a
57

KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 11, at 193 n.2.
See Barbara Collura, The Costs of Infertility Treatment, FAM. BUILDING, Summer 2006,
available at http://www.resolve.org/site/PageServer?pagename=lrn_mta_cost (breaking down the costs
of IUI and IVF in terms of surgery and medications); see also KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 11,
at 193 n.2 (noting that the high cost of American fertility treatments has led many Americans to seek
less costly fertility treatments in countries such as Germany, Israel, Columbia, France, South Africa,
and Singapore).
59
KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 11, at 197−98, 200.
60
RESOLVE: The National Fertility Association, Health Insurance 101, http://www.resolve.org/
site/PageServer?pagename=lrn_ic_101 (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
61
These include: Arkansas, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New
Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island. Janet L. Kaminski, Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment
(Conn. Gen. Assembly Office of Legislative Research Report No. 2005-R-0236, 2005), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/rpt/2005-R-0236.htm. See also Chen May Yee & Josephine Marcotty,
Miracles for Sale, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 22, 2007, at 1A (discussing the various ways that
couples finance fertility treatments).
62
HAW. REV. STAT. § 432:1-604(3) (2005); Kaminski, supra note 61.
63
215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356m (West 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27-46.1x (West
2006); Kaminski, supra note 61.
64
Gross, supra note 56.
65
N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 3221(k)(6), 4303(s) (McKinney 2006). For more information on state
specific laws, see RESOLVE: The National Fertility Association, Infertility Coverage in Your State,
http://www.resolve.org/site/PageServer?pagename=lrn_ic_stintro (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) (discussing
fifteen states’ infertility insurance laws).
66
Infertility Coverage in Your State, supra note 65.
58
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segment on infertility in February 2010. One woman complained that
although she had insurance coverage, she had exhausted her lifetime
infertility benefits in just three months, from June to August.68 A mandate
to offer, in contrast, only requires that insurance companies make available
for purchase a policy that covers infertility treatment; employers are under
no obligation to purchase the plans.69 Five states (California, Connecticut,
Ohio, Texas, and West Virginia) currently require insurers to offer fertility
treatment coverage to group health plan sponsors.70
But even in the fifteen states that have a mandate to cover or a mandate
to offer, the federal ERISA statute preempts state law, thereby precluding
employers with self-funded health plans from falling within the scope of
the statute.71 Because they are not required to offer coverage, these
employers have been reluctant to do so, fearing it would cause employee
premiums to increase.72 Consequently, many couples face the daunting
task of paying for fertility treatments themselves, often going into extreme
debt to do so, or declining treatment all together.73
B. Infertility as a Work Problem: Putting Employers on Guard
In addition to the negative physical and psychological side effects of
treatment, there are professional consequences as well. Of the 6.1 million
women battling infertility, approximately seventy percent are employed.74
Those in need of time-consuming fertility treatments face a fundamental
problem: fertility treatments require the patient to have a flexible schedule,
something many working women lack.75
For example, if a blood test indicates that a patient has a forty-eighthour window in which to undergo impregnation procedures, then there is
relatively little opportunity for advanced planning.76 It is now or never.
And therein lies the conundrum: the female worker must decide whether to
place her career in jeopardy by asking her employer for a more flexible or

67

The View (ABC television broadcast Feb. 25, 2010).
Id.
Health Insurance 101, supra note 60.
70
Kaminski, supra note 61.
71
KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 11, at 200.
72
See Yee & Marcotty, supra note 61.
73
Id.
74
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
75
In 2004, only 26.7% of women and 28.1% of men worked flexible schedules that allowed them
to alter the time they began or ended work. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Flexible Work Schedules
in 2004, THE EDITOR’S DESK, July 5, 2005, http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2005/jul/wk1/art01.htm. For
further discussion of the impact workplace flexibility has on women, see generally Vicki Schultz,
Feminism and Workplace Flexibility, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1203 (2010).
76
See LaPorta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (discussing
a three-day time constraint on the plaintiff to undergo an egg harvesting procedure).
68
69
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reduced work schedule. Not doing so could result in childlessness, but
doing so can have significant professional consequences. Many legal
scholars have suggested and, indeed, some courts have found that
employers often assume that a woman who reveals her desire to have a
child is shifting her priorities from work to family.78 This revelation is
especially problematic for the infertile woman: she must reveal both her
desire to have a child and her inability to do so without recourse to
expensive and time-consuming79 artificial treatment. Thus, infertile
women have the potential to strain companies’ resources more than fertile
women, giving employers extra motive to terminate them.
This is particularly true because the potential for the infertile woman to
strain company resources can last in excess of the nine-month gestation
period of traditional pregnant workers.80 Fertility treatments such as IVF
have only a twenty-five percent success rate and often must be tried again,
causing the pregnancy process to sometimes last for years.81 Women
undergoing fertility treatments are in a prolonged, perpetual state of
pregnancy in their employers’ eyes—one without a predictable end and
one with the potential to strain resources indefinitely.82
77
Unlike the traditional pregnant employee who keeps her pregnancy under wraps until after the
first trimester, infertile women are unique in that they are often forced to reveal a potential pregnancy
before they are pregnant in order to secure the necessary time off. Compare Clay v. Holy Cross Hosp.,
253 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that the plaintiff did not disclose her pregnancy to her
employer until she was seven months pregnant), with Nalco II, 534 F.3d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 2008)
(describing an infertile woman who disclosed her condition to her supervisors before she became
pregnant). This request gives an employer notice that an employee is potentially pregnant.
78
See Clay, 253 F.3d at 1009 (finding that hospital administration fired a pregnant doctor who
they felt “lacked the drive, work ethic, and dedication”); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., No. 82-3156,
1983 WL 612, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 1983) (finding the plaintiff’s “expressed desire to combine
motherhood with her sales career was a determining factor in defendant’s decision to remove her” from
her job); see also Kellee Boulais Kruse, The Protections Offered to Non-Pregnant Plaintiffs by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act 5–8 (George Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper No. 427, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1234702 (discussing this problem in detail as it relates to pregnant employees, infertile employees, and
employees contemplating starting a family).
79
See Sowers, supra note 3.
80
For example, an infertile woman undergoing consecutive, unsuccessful infertility treatments
may require considerable time off over a long period, and may need further accommodations if a
treatment results in pregnancy.
81
Tarkan, supra note 39.
82
This perpetual state of pregnancy is similar to that which adoptive mothers experience. See
SHERRY F. COLB, WHEN SEX COUNTS: MAKING BABIES AND MAKING LAW 217 (2007). Colb writes:
In October 2002, I adopted a beautiful baby girl from China. While I was
waiting to learn when I would travel and who would become my new child, a
colleague told me that I was “not showing yet.” This joke comes back to me now.
Because I was becoming a mother for the first time, the colleague thought of me as
in a state of virtual pregnancy, one in which I would eventually begin “showing” but
had not yet begun to do so.
Id. In the floor debate for the PDA, Senator Harrison Williams stated that employers’ different
treatment of females because of their capacity to have children is exactly what the PDA intended to
combat. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978, at 61 (1979)
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (“Because of their capacity to become pregnant, women have been
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The likelihood that an infertile employee will strain company resources
provides little incentive for an employer to accommodate or retain infertile
female employees.83 As a result, preemptive termination—the firing of a
woman who an employer suspects will drain company resources over a
prolonged period of time—remains a major problem for the infertile
woman.84 Although the number of claims alleging workplace
discrimination against infertile women is unknown, case law and the
increased use of fertility treatments suggests it is a problem that deserves
attention.85
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND THE PDA
Does the PDA prohibit discrimination based on infertility? Does it
require insurance coverage for infertility? The language of the PDA is
vague, which proves to be a double-edged sword that can both help—and
hurt—arguments for the protection of infertility. Additionally, because
time-consuming and costly fertility treatments such as IVF were not
available in the United States at the time the PDA was enacted, the PDA’s
legislative history is of limited use in discerning the legislature’s intent.86
Nonetheless, an analysis of the legislative history and accompanying
materials suggests that protection of infertility is consistent with the
purpose of this remedial statute.
Congress passed the PDA in response to the Supreme Court’s decision
in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, which held that discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination.87 In Gilbert, the Supreme
viewed as marginal workers not deserving the full benefits of compensation and advancement. . . . In
some of these cases, the employer refused to consider women for particular types of jobs on the
grounds that they might become pregnant.”).
83
See Nalco II, 534 F.3d 644, 645–46 (7th Cir. 2008) (involving a woman who was fired after she
told her employer about her infertility); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1396–97
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (involving a woman undergoing fertility treatments).
84
The EEOC does not keep records of claims filed for discrimination on the basis of infertility,
but in 2009 the EEOC received 6196 complaints alleging a violation of the PDA. EEOC, Pregnancy
Discrimination Charges, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/pregnancy.cfm (last visited
Apr. 2, 2010).
85
See L.A. Schieve et al., Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology—United States, 1996 and
1998, 51 MMWR WEEKLY 97 (2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/
mm5105a2.htm (describing how the utilization of fertility treatments increased more than twenty-five
percent in a two-year span, between 1996 and 1998); see also Cleese v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 911 F.
Supp. 1312, 1318 (D. Or. 1995) (“It is simply common sense to recognize that an employer may treat a
female employee differently when it knows that she can or will become pregnant.”); Pacourek, 858 F.
Supp. at 1400–01 (finding discrimination after an employee announced her intention to undergo
fertility treatments); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., No. 82-3156, 1983 WL 612, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 1,
1983) (finding that the plaintiff’s “expressed desire to combine motherhood with her sales career was a
determining factor in defendant’s decision to remove her”).
86
The first American IVF baby was born on December 28, 1981. PBS, supra note 42. This was
more than three years after passage of the PDA.
87
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 128 (1976).
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Court ruled in favor of General Electric’s disability plan, which excluded
insurance coverage for women with pregnancy-related disabilities.88 The
Court’s holding was based on the premise that the exclusion was
condition-related, not sex-related.89 But Justice Brennan, in a strongly
worded dissent, argued that “the Court’s assumption that General Electric
engaged in a gender-neutral risk-assignment process is purely fanciful”
since General Electric had a history of practices designed to undercut the
achievement of women who became pregnant while employed.90 Justice
Brennan further explained that plans excluding pregnancy coverage “both
financially burden women workers and act to break down the continuity of
the employment relationship, thereby exacerbating women’s comparatively
transient role in the labor force.”91 Justice Stevens, in his own dissenting
opinion, added that the plan was blatantly gender-based because “it is the
capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female
from the male.”92
After Gilbert, Representative Augustus Hawkins sponsored a 1977 bill
to clarify the scope of the word “sex” in Title VII’s prohibition against sex
discrimination.93 Representative Hawkins was instrumental in passing
Title VII and strongly believed that targeting discrimination in the
workforce was necessary for the advancement of civil rights.94 Ninety-two
members of the House of Representatives agreed with him and cosponsored the bill.95 The stated purpose of the bill was to add a new
subsection to section 701—section 701(k)—that would “explicitly provide
that the terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions.”96
Wendy Williams, a professor at Georgetown Law School, submitted a
prepared statement to the Committee on Education and Labor that
encapsulates the main problem that women of childbearing age face in the
workplace: all women of childbearing age are subject to the effects of the
stereotype that they are marginal workers because “until a woman passes
the childbearing age, she is viewed by employers as potentially

88

Id.
Id. at 134. This is the same premise that courts would later use to deny coverage for infertility
treatment. See infra notes 132–40 and accompanying text (discussing Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316
F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003)).
90
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91
Id. at 158 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92
Id. at 162 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 11–12.
94
Black Americans in Congress, Augustus Freeman (Gus) Hawkins, http://baic.house.gov/
member-profiles/profile.html?intID=30 (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
95
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 11.
96
Id. at 13.
89
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pregnant.” During the floor debate, Senator Alan Cranston emphasized
that the bill did not give women special treatment; instead, pregnant
workers able to work would be treated the same as other able workers, and
pregnant workers unable to work would be treated the same as other
disabled workers.98
Despite calculations that mandating insurance coverage for pregnant
women would cost an additional $1.7 billion each year,99 the bill passed in
1978, and section 701(k) became known as the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act. A milestone for women, the PDA prohibits an employer from: (1)
refusing to hire a pregnant woman because of her pregnancy or pregnancyrelated condition, or because of the prejudices of co-workers, clients, or
customers; and (2) singling out pregnancy-related conditions for specific
procedures to determine an employee’s ability to work.100 The PDA
further places an affirmative duty on employers to treat pregnancy-related
medical conditions similarly to other medical conditions, both in terms of
employment and with respect to employer-funded health plans.101
But the PDA, which was intended to eradicate confusion by
broadening the definition of sex discrimination to include pregnancy-based
discrimination, caused confusion of its own. Just what is a pregnancyrelated medical condition? Must a woman be pregnant to have a related
medical condition? Is infertility included within the definition of
pregnancy discrimination? These questions, and others like them, would
continue to confront courts in the years following passage of the PDA.102

97
Discrimination Based on Pregnancy: Hearing on S. 995 Before the Subcommittee on Labor,
95th Cong. 1st Sess., 113–17 (Apr. 26, 1977), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 30;
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY FOUNDATIONS 128, 179 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1995).
98
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 131.
99
The Health Insurance Association of America provided this high estimate. Id. at 46.
100
EEOC, Facts About Pregnancy Discrimination, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fspreg.cfm (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
101
Id.
102
See United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197 (1991) (finding that the
PDA protects women even before they are pregnant); Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 347
(2d Cir. 2003) (holding that infertility is a gender-neutral condition and therefore falls outside the scope
of protections afforded by the PDA); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir.
1996) (same); Panizzi v. City of Chicago Bd. of Educ., No. 07-C-846, 2007 WL 4233755, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 19, 2007) (holding that women who are not pregnant at the time of the adverse action are not
protected by the PDA); La Porta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 770 (W.D. Mich. 2001)
(finding that “[n]either the language nor the legislative history of the PDA reflects an intent to cover
infertility”); Cleese v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 911 F. Supp. 1312, 1317–18 (D. Or. 1995) (holding that
the PDA protects a female employee who informed her employer that she was undergoing fertility
treatments, but who was not pregnant at the time of the termination); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858
F. Supp 1393, 1402–03 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that infertility is a pregnancy-related medical
condition).
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IV. RELEVANT CASE LAW AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Supreme Court: Johnson Controls
The Supreme Court has not decided a case involving the scope of the
PDA since 1991, and that decision left many questions unanswered. In
United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, female employees brought a
class action suit against their employer alleging Title VII sex
discrimination.103
The employer, Johnson Controls, ran a battery
manufacturing plant that processed lead.104 To protect fetuses in utero,
Johnson Controls announced a policy barring only women, except those
whose infertility was documented, from jobs involving high levels of lead
exposure.105 The trial court considered whether this policy had a disparate
impact on women. Disparate impact is a basis of liability whereby an
employer, even if it lacked discriminatory intent, becomes liable for a
facially-neutral policy that has an adverse effect on members of a protected
class.106 If the plaintiff establishes a disparate impact, then the employer
must prove that the challenged practice is “job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity.”107
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer,
finding that the fertility policy, even though it caused a disparate impact,
was a business necessity because it promoted workers’ safety.108 On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that disparate impact was the correct
basis of liability and noted that the outcome would have been the same
even if the court had used a disparate treatment analysis.109 Disparate
treatment, unlike disparate impact, requires that a plaintiff show, by direct
or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had discriminatory intent
Facially
when instituting a facially discriminatory policy.110
discriminatory policies are only permitted if sex, national origin, or
religion is a bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business.111 The
103

Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 192.
Id. at 190.
105
Id. at 192. The policy defined “women . . . capable of bearing children” as “[a]ll women
except those whose inability to bear children is medically documented.” Id. (citations omitted).
106
See United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309, 316 (E.D. Wis. 1988)
(describing that, although a fetal protection policy was “facially neutral,” it had a disproportionate
impact on women).
107
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
108
Johnson Controls, 680 F. Supp. at 316–17.
109
United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 893–94 (7th Cir. 1989), rev’d,
499 U.S. 187 (1991).
110
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (defining unlawful employer practices that may result in disparate
treatment); § 2000e-2(m) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”).
111
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
104
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Seventh Circuit found that the employer had established a valid BFOQ
defense because the fertility policy was reasonably necessary to the
operation of Johnson Controls’ business.112
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and Justice Blackmun, writing
for the majority, reversed the decision of the Seventh Circuit and held that
Johnson Controls’ fetal protection policy discriminated against women in
violation of the PDA.113 The Court found that the PDA prohibits an
employer from discriminating against a woman because of her
“childbearing capacity.”114
In reaching this conclusion, the Court evaluated the classification itself
and the employer conduct complained of using a disparate treatment
analysis.115 The Court made it clear that the policy was discriminatory
because it classified “on the basis of gender and childbearing capacity,
rather than fertility alone.”116 This finding is significant for two reasons.
First, it could be understood to suggest that classifications based on
fertility—and, by like implication infertility—are not pregnancy-related
medical conditions protected by the PDA.117 Second, because the policy
facially discriminated on the basis of gender, the Court had to determine
whether the health of unborn fetuses was reasonably necessary to the
operation of Johnson Controls’ business; it held that it was not.118
Put simply, Johnson Controls ran afoul of the PDA because the
employer conduct complained of—applying a fertility policy to only
women—was not gender-neutral. Johnson Controls applied its fetal
protection policy unequally with respect to men and women—fertile
women, but not fertile men, were prohibited from working with lead
batteries. In dicta, the Court suggested that Johnson Controls would have
been immune from liability if it had applied its fertility policy to fertile
women and fertile men.119 Subsequent court decisions have erroneously
interpreted this as suggesting that a policy that is applied to infertile
women and infertile men would never run afoul of the PDA.120 This is
112

Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 898.
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 197.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 199–200.
116
Id. at 198.
117
See infra note 122 and accompanying text (citing an Eighth Circuit case where infertility was
alleged as the principal basis for discrimination in violation of the PDA).
118
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 202–04.
119
See id. at 197 (“The bias in Johnson Controls’ policy is obvious. Fertile men, but not fertile
women, are given a choice as to whether they wish to risk their reproductive health for a particular
job.”). This classification, the Court found, is facially discriminatory in violation of Title VII’s
prohibition of sex discrimination: “Johnson Controls’ policy is not neutral because it does not apply to
the reproductive capacity of the company’s male employees in the same way as it applies to that of the
females.” Id. at 198–99.
120
See Nalco II, 534 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2008); Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337,
345–46 (2d Cir. 2003); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1996).
113
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false. The policy at issue in Johnson Controls is distinguishable from an
absentee policy for infertile workers. If the employer in Johnson Controls
had applied its policy equally to women and men, the consequences for
each group of workers would have been the same, namely, an inability to
work. But, if an employer applies an absentee policy for infertile workers
equally to women and men, then women will always suffer more because
fertility treatments are more time-consuming for women.
B. The Eighth Circuit: Krauel
Five years after the Supreme Court decided Johnson Controls, the
Eighth Circuit considered whether the PDA covers infertility.121 In Krauel
v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, a female employee alleged that her
employer’s policy denying insurance coverage for her fertility treatments
discriminated against her on the basis of her infertility, thereby violating
the PDA.122
Krauel, a respiratory therapist at Iowa Methodist Medical Center
(“IMCC”), was diagnosed with endometriosis, a condition that causes
tissue to grow abnormally outside the uterus, often causing severe pain and
She had difficulty becoming pregnant naturally and
infertility.123
underwent three fertility treatments, the last of which was successful.124
IMCC denied coverage for Krauel’s fertility treatments but provided
coverage for her pregnancy and delivery expenses.125
Krauel advanced disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of
liability and argued that infertility is a medical condition related to
pregnancy because there is a causal connection—fertility causes pregnancy
while infertility prevents pregnancy. In other words, both affect one’s
childbearing capacity.126 To evaluate Krauel’s argument, the Eighth
Circuit analyzed the statutory construction of the PDA by applying the
following rule: “[W]hen a general term [(‘related medical conditions’)]
follows a specific one [(‘pregnancy’ and ‘childbirth’)], the general term
should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with
specific enumeration.”127
The court found that infertility was not sufficiently akin to pregnancy
and childbirth because (1) they occur after conception, while infertility
occurs prior to conception;128 and (2) the legislative history makes no

121

Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679.
Id. at 676, 679.
123
Id. at 675–76.
124
Id. at 676.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 679.
127
Id.
128
Id. (emphasis added).
122
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129

reference to fertility treatments.
Thus, the Eighth Circuit held that the
exclusion of infertility coverage from Krauel’s benefits plan was not in
violation of the PDA because infertility was not a pregnancy-related
medical condition.130 Importantly, the court also rejected Krauel’s
argument, on the basis of insufficient statistical evidence, that the policy
had a disparate impact on women because they undergo treatment and bear
a greater proportion of the costs; however, the court’s holding suggests that
disparate impact might be shown where statistical evidence is sufficient to
meet the burden of proof.131
C. The Second Circuit: Saks
In 2003, the Second Circuit affirmed a ruling nearly identical to the
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Krauel.132 The plaintiff in Saks v. Franklin
Covey Co., Rochelle Saks, claimed that her employer’s health benefits
plan, which excluded coverage for surgical impregnation procedures,
violated the PDA’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of pregnancy
and “related medical conditions.”133 Saks also argued that the plan
discriminated on the basis of sex because surgical impregnation procedures
by their very nature are sex-specific, as they can only be performed on
women.134
The court noted the fundamental problem with the PDA: “Related
medical conditions . . . clearly embraces more than pregnancy itself . . . .
The question is how much more.”135 To answer this question, the court
analyzed the text of the statute by “look[ing] to the particular statutory
language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a
whole.”136 The court found:
Title VII is, at its core, a statute that prohibits
discrimination “because of,” inter alia, an individual’s sex.
The PDA modified Title VII by requiring that discrimination
on the basis of “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions” be considered discrimination “because of sex.”
Because reproductive capacity is common to both men and
women, we do not read the PDA as introducing a completely
new classification of prohibited discrimination based solely
on reproductive capacity. Rather, the PDA . . . [prohibits] . . .
129

Id.
Id. at 680.
131
Id. at 681.
132
Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 347 (2d Cir. 2003).
133
Id. at 345 (internal citations omitted).
134
Id. at 346.
135
Id. at 345.
136
Id. (internal citations omitted).
130
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discrimination based on “childbearing capacity . . . .”

The court reasoned that reproductive capacity—fertility or infertility—
as opposed to childbearing capacity, is gender-neutral and outside of the
scope of the PDA because infertility affects men and women in equal
proportions.138 Specifically, the court noted that “[i]ncluding infertility
within the PDA’s protection . . . would result in the anomaly of defining a
class that simultaneously includes equal numbers of both sexes and yet is
somehow vulnerable to sex discrimination.”139 Affirming the decision of
the district court, the Second Circuit held that an employer’s health plan
excluding coverage for fertility treatments performed solely on women was
lawful.140
Importantly, the court expressly declined to consider whether an
infertile female employee would be able to state a claim under the PDA or
Title VII for an adverse employment action taken against her because she
took numerous sick days to undergo surgical impregnation procedures.141
This is likely because the court foresaw the disparate impact such a policy
would have on women.
D. The Seventh Circuit: Pacourek, Nalco I, and Nalco II
Although it would not be until July 2008 that the Seventh Circuit
considered the PDA’s coverage of infertility, the District Court of the
Northern District of Illinois addressed the question in 1994.142 In Pacourek
v. Inland Steel Co., the court held, on grounds that the PDA is to be
broadly construed, that infertility is a pregnancy-related medical
condition.143 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit would back-pedal on this
holding fourteen years later, in Nalco II, by limiting the scope of PDA
coverage to only infertile women undergoing fertility treatments.144
1. Pacourek
Charlene Pacourek, diagnosed with a medical condition that rendered
her infertile, entered an experimental fertility treatment program at the
University of Chicago.145 Pacourek alleged that upon notifying her
employer of her efforts to become pregnant, her supervisor verbally abused
her about her infertility, expressed doubt as to her ability to become
pregnant, and was skeptical of her ability to combine pregnancy and her
137

Id. at 345–46 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 346.
Id.
140
Id. at 349.
141
Id. at 346 n.4.
142
Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1396–97 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
143
Id. at 1402–03.
144
Nalco II, 534 F.3d 644, 648–49 (7th Cir. 2008).
145
Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1396.
138
139
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career.
Pacourek’s supervisor also informed her that she was a “high
risk” employee and subsequently terminated her.147
The court in Pacourek was the first to recognize the unique
relationship between fertility, women, and the workplace: “Only women
can become pregnant; stereotypes based on pregnancy and related medical
conditions have been a barrier to women’s economic advancement; and
classifications based on pregnancy and related medical conditions are
never gender-neutral.”148 Unlike in Krauel, the court made no distinction
between medical conditions that occur pre-conception and postconception; Johnson Controls precluded that reasoning since the Supreme
Court held that the PDA applies before pregnancy.149
The court held that “discrimination against persons who intend to or
can potentially become pregnant is discrimination against women, which is
the kind of truism the PDA wrote into law.”150 The court added that “[t]o
hold . . . that it is illegal under the PDA to discriminate on the basis of
potential or intended pregnancy, is not necessarily to hold that the
plaintiff’s condition [of infertility] is related to pregnancy for purposes of
the PDA.”151 That is a separate, additional analysis that the court
undertook.
Like the courts in Saks and Krauel, the district court in Pacourek
looked first to the legislative history of the PDA for guidance.152 But
rather than take a restrictive approach to statutory interpretation, the court
looked at the statute through the lens of a “well settled canon of statutory
construction that remedial statutes, such as civil rights laws, are to be
broadly construed.”153
The court noted that the expansive language prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions”
supported its holding that female infertility is a medical condition related
to pregnancy and childbirth for purposes of the PDA.154 The modifier
“related,” the court found, is purposefully broad and suggests that the Act
applies to the whole childbearing process, not just to that which occurs
post-conception.155 The court noted that this reading was consistent with
the legislature’s intent to repudiate Gilbert and cited the floor debate
146

Id. at 1396, 1401.
Id. at 1397.
Id. at 1401.
149
Id. at 1402.
150
Id. at 1401.
151
Id. at 1402.
152
Id. at 1402–03.
153
Id. at 1402 (internal quotations omitted).
154
Id. But, in an effort to quell employers’ fears, the court noted that this decision did not instruct
employers to treat a woman’s infertility in a certain way; it only requires that they treat her medical
condition neutrally. Id. at 1403.
155
Id. at 1402.
147
148
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testimony of Senator Harrison Williams:
[B]ecause of their capacity to become pregnant, women have
been viewed as marginal workers not deserving the full
benefits of compensation and advancement . . . . In some of
these cases, the employer refused to consider women for
particular types of jobs on the grounds that they might
become pregnant. . . . The overall effect of discrimination
against women because they might become pregnant . . . is to
relegate women in general . . . to a second-class status.156
The court added that “once it is determined that a classification is in
contravention of the PDA, that classification is not to be further tested with
an eye toward approving the classification if it is found to be gender
neutral in its specific content.”157 In other words, a painstaking search for
gender neutrality based on hypothetical situations is insufficient to strip the
classification of protection.
2. Nalco I
After Pacourek, more than a decade passed before the Seventh Circuit
considered whether the PDA protects infertility. In 2003, Cheryl Hall, a
sales secretary, informed her boss that she wished to take a leave of
absence from work to undergo fertility treatment.158 Around this same
time, her company began a massive reorganization and consolidation of its
offices, requiring the elimination of one of two sales secretary positions.159
Hall’s first treatment failed, and she again asked for time off to undergo a
second round of treatment.160 Her employer terminated her two weeks
later.161 Hall’s supervisor had discussed the termination with an employee
relations manager whose notes reflected that Hall “missed a lot of work
due to health” and cited “absenteeism” due to “infertility treatments.”162
At the time of her termination, Hall’s supervisor explained that it was “in
[her] best interest due to [her] health condition.”163
Hall filed a complaint with the Northern District of Illinois alleging
that she was terminated in violation of the PDA.164 In an unpublished
September 12, 2006, opinion, the district court held that infertility is not a
pregnancy-related medical condition protected by the PDA and granted
156

Id. (internal citations and emphasis omitted).
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158
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165

judgment in favor of Nalco. In doing so, the court ignored the reasoning
in Pacourek and relied instead on the same arguments found in the Second
Circuit’s opinion in Saks and the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Krauel.166
The court found that no sex discrimination occurred because infertility
affects men and women with equal frequency.167 To hold otherwise, the
court explained, would be incompatible with the PDA’s definition,
“because of sex,” since it would result in the anomaly of including equal
numbers of both sexes.168 The court failed to realize that the employer
conduct complained of—terminating employees who take time off for
fertility treatment—will always affect women more than men because
fertility treatment is more onerous and time-consuming for women.
The court also noted that the legislative history contained no reference
to fertility treatments.169 As discussed in Part IV, this is necessarily so
because fertility treatments were in their infancy in 1978. It was not until
more invasive and time-consuming procedures became widely available
that fertility treatments proved burdensome for women in the workforce.
3. Nalco II
Cheryl Hall appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of her employer, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit heard arguments on June 4, 2007.170 Judge Sykes, writing for the
majority, held that Hall had indeed stated a claim for sex discrimination
under the PDA and reversed the decision of the lower court, remanding the
case for further fact-finding.171 This opinion was novel because although
the court agreed with the Eighth and Second Circuits that the PDA does
not protect infertility, the court held that the PDA does protect women
undergoing fertility treatments.172 The court recognized fertility treatment
(specifically, IVF) as a treatment that “takes weeks to complete” and
sometimes requires “multiple treatments,” a treatment that burdens women
more than men.173
The Seventh Circuit subtly faulted the district court for relying on Saks
and Krauel.174 First, the court noted that any reliance on Saks was
misplaced because the Second Circuit expressly declined to consider the
165
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question presented in Nalco.
Second, the court noted that Saks and
Krauel misconstrued the holding of Johnson Controls.176 While the court
acknowledged that Johnson Controls suggested that infertility is genderneutral, it nonetheless found that “even where (in)fertility [a gender-neutral
condition] is at issue, the employer conduct complained of must actually be
gender neutral.”177 The employer’s conduct in Johnson Controls ran afoul
of this mandate by treating fertile female employees and fertile male
employees differently: only females were barred from working with
lead.178
The court found the same was true in the case of Cheryl Hall. Nalco’s
conduct—terminating employees for taking time off to undergo IVF—only
affects women because IVF involves a surgical impregnation procedure
that can only be performed on women.179 It is thus irrelevant that infertility
affects men and women equally; the employer conduct complained of was
not gender-neutral because only women take significant time off to
undergo IVF.
There is one significant difference, however, between Johnson
Controls and Nalco II: the Supreme Court analyzed Johnson Controls as a
disparate treatment case, whereas the Nalco II court appears to have
analyzed Hall’s claim as a disparate impact case. The court would have
been wise to have explicitly stated this point, thereby clarifying the parties’
respective burdens of proof. By not doing so, the court opened up the
possibility that Hall could have argued a disparate treatment or mixedmotives case on remand.180
V. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HALL V. NALCO
A. An Uphill Battle on Remand
Hall’s attorney, Eugene Hollander, was quoted in the Wall Street
Journal after the decision in Nalco II, claiming that because of this ruling,
women will have to worry less about the “‘repercussions of taking time off
for IVF.’”181 This analysis ignores the fact that plaintiffs such as Hall still
face an uphill battle on remand.182 The Seventh Circuit merely held that
Hall had indeed stated a cognizable claim of sex discrimination on which a
175
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trier of fact could find that she was terminated based on sex-specific
fertility treatments.183 Hall wisely settled, instead of pursuing her case in
court. If she had litigated her claim, she would have faced difficulty
proving her case, regardless of whether she framed it as one of disparate
impact, disparate treatment, or mixed motives.
It would have been difficult for Hall to be successful on remand if she
framed her case as one of disparate impact because the Seventh Circuit has
found that PDA plaintiffs cannot succeed under the concept of disparate
impact in cases involving absenteeism, since attendance at work is a
business necessity.184 In Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, the Seventh
Circuit recognized that PDA plaintiffs might attack a company’s policy on
absenteeism as having a disparate impact if it could be shown that the
policy weighed more heavily on members of a protected class (e.g.,
pregnant employees or women undergoing fertility treatments) and if this
policy was not justified by a business necessity.185 The court found that the
second prong will never be satisfied because the concept of disparate
impact is intended only for cases in which employers impose eligibility
requirements not really necessary for the job, such as height or weight
requirements.186 Attendance will always be necessary for a job. Like a
pregnant woman who is absent from work because of morning sickness,
Hall’s disparate impact claim would fail because an employer is under no
obligation to excuse women from having to satisfy the necessary
requirements of their jobs.187
If Hall had litigated her case, she may have been more successful if she
framed her claim as a disparate treatment case. Even then, however, her
employer would have two arguments: (1) it terminated her as part of its
reorganization process, not because of her fertility treatments; and (2) even
if it terminated her for getting fertility treatments, her attendance at work is
a BFOQ.
In response to the first argument, Hall’s attorney would likely have
argued a mixed-motives case because Hall’s IVF attempts and the
company reorganization were in close temporal proximity.188 This would
reduce Hall’s burden of proof. Hall did not need to prove that her sex was
a but-for cause of her termination, only that it was one factor in her
183
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employer’s decisionmaking process. The comments of Hall’s supervisor
and the notes of the employee-relations manager could have been used as
circumstantial evidence to create an inference of discrimination.190
The timing of her supervisor’s remarks is critical.191 When terminating
Hall, her supervisor told her that it “was in [her] best interest due to [her]
health condition.”192 This proves that a nexus existed between Hall’s
fertility treatments and her termination. Unfortunately, the record is
somewhat vague as to whether the supervisor, on her own, made the
decision to fire Hall. If her supervisor was the decision maker, then Hall
could have had a strong claim that her comment was not a stray remark,
but instead shows discriminatory intent.193
Nalco’s second likely argument—that attendance at work is a BFOQ—
would be based on the premise that strict attendance is reasonably
necessary to the normal operation or essence of Nalco’s business and that
Nalco had a reasonable factual basis for believing that all women receiving
fertility treatments would be able to perform the job inefficiently.194
One Seventh Circuit case analyzing the BFOQ in the context of a
pregnancy discrimination claim is worth noting. In Maldonado v. U.S.
Bank & Manufacturer’s Bank, a female bank teller claimed she was fired
after notifying her employer that she was pregnant.195 In fact, the bank
conceded that it had fired the bank teller for this reason.196 The bank
argued that her pregnancy and anticipated due date would have made her
unavailable in the summer months, a qualification necessary for the normal
operation of the business.197 Assuming that summer availability was a
BFOQ, the court considered situations where an employer might be
justified in taking anticipatory action against a pregnant employee: “an
189

See id. (stating that sex need only be “a” motivating factor).
See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151–54 (2000) (holding that
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the employer took into consideration other legitimate factors when making a termination decision).
191
Compare Barnes v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1214–15 (D. Kan. 2007)
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worker was not enough to establish discriminatory intent).
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decision of which the plaintiff complains expressed discriminatory feelings is not evidence that the
decision had a discriminatory motivation.”).
194
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employer cannot take anticipatory action unless it has a good faith basis,
supported by sufficiently strong evidence, that the normal inconveniences
of an employee’s pregnancy will require special treatment.”198
The court noted that it will rarely be demonstrable that a woman will
be unable to meet a BFOQ in the future, but it did suggest that this burden
may be met in cases where an employee announces that she will be
unavailable to work in the future and explicitly requests special
treatment.199 Because the bank was merely speculating as to the
employee’s availability in the summer months, the court held that the bank
was not justified in firing the plaintiff.200
Unlike the plaintiff in Maldonado, Cheryl Hall specifically asked for
time off in order to undergo fertility treatments.201 Therefore, Nalco may
have tried to show that Hall was fired for her anticipated absenteeism
based on the employee-relation manager’s notes, which stated
“absenteeism—infertility treatments.”202 Nalco’s BFOQ defense would
likely have succeeded unless Hall could prove that her supervisor’s
comment indicated that it was not her absenteeism, but her fertility
treatments that motivated her employer to fire her.203 In any event, Hall
would have faced an uphill battle on remand since the manager’s notes
(“missed a lot of work due to health” and “absenteeism—infertility
treatments”) might have counteracted the sufficiency of her supervisor’s
remarks (that termination was in her “best interest due to [her] health
condition”) in creating an inference of sex discrimination.204
B. A Battle that Never Ends: Still No Insurance Coverage
Even if Hall had gone to trial and was successful on remand, she
would still be responsible for the crippling costs of IVF. The Nalco
decision is an incomplete solution for infertile working women because its
limited holding—extending protection to women undergoing fertility
treatment, but not to all infertile women—does not extend to cases in
which an employer excludes costly fertility treatments from its health plan.
Nalco II makes it unlawful to discriminate against a woman with
respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because of her use of fertility treatments. This assumes that
the woman has already obtained medical treatment for her infertility,
suggesting that the employer is under no legal obligation to cover the cost
198
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of treatment. If, on the other hand, the law protected women with
infertility much in the same way that the law protects pregnancy,205 then
employers would be required to provide insurance coverage for fertility
treatments.
Numerous policy rationales support the argument that employers ought
to provide health plans that cover fertility treatment. First, providing
coverage for fertility treatments is similar to providing coverage for
contraceptives, since both affect one’s ability to become pregnant.206
Second, providing coverage can help attract and retain workers, ultimately
improving a company’s bottom line.207 Third, contrary to critics’
arguments, providing coverage for treatments causes only a slight increase
in employees’ premiums.208 Fourth, the ability to have children is a human
right and employees seem to recognize this, as evidenced by their
willingness to pay increased premiums so that infertile women may receive
treatment.209
Employers should be required to provide insurance coverage for
female fertility treatments that help increase the chances for pregnancy
because the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has
ruled that employers must provide coverage for female contraceptives,
which help decrease the chances for pregnancy.210 In 2000, the EEOC
concluded that employers who fail to provide insurance coverage for
female contraceptive drugs and devices may be discriminating against
females (and males with female dependents) if they provide insurance
coverage for other preventative treatment.211
The EEOC found that a classification based on contraception is a
classification based on pregnancy for two reasons. First, the EEOC
concluded that avoiding being pregnant and being pregnant are the same
for purposes of the PDA.212 In reaching this conclusion, the EEOC relied
on the holding in Johnson Controls that the PDA protects “a woman’s
205
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The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions;
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213

potential for pregnancy, as well as pregnancy itself.” Second, the EEOC
rejected the respondents’ argument that a plan barring coverage for all
contraception for women and men, equally, was not discriminatory
because prescription contraceptives are available only for women.214 It
might also have added that while both men and women can prevent
pregnancy, it is easy and cheap for men to do so, but can be difficult and
expensive for women.
In much the same way, an employer’s health plan excluding IVF
treatment coverage for men and women will always affect women more
than men because surgical impregnation procedures are only available for
women. Akin to denying contraception coverage, denying IVF coverage
always burdens women more than men because fertility treatments are
cheap and easy for men but difficult and expensive for women.215 In
addition, if avoiding being pregnant and being pregnant are equivalent
under the PDA, then it follows that trying to become pregnant is also
protected. Finally, because the majority of employer-sponsored health
plans provide coverage for contraceptives intended to prevent
pregnancy,216 they should also be required under the PDA to provide
coverage for fertility treatments intended to achieve pregnancy.
Including coverage for fertility treatments is in an employer’s best
interest because doing so can help attract and retain workers. For example,
Erin Davis loved her job at a public relations firm, but she quit because her
company’s health insurance would not pay for her high-tech fertility
treatments.217 She found Sprint, a telecommunications company, one of
only about twenty percent of large firms whose insurance plan covered
213
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Id. See also Joanna Grossman, Insurance Coverage for Birth Control: The EEOC Speaks,
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fertility treatments.
Even though she was paid less at this new job, she
came out ahead because Sprint covered four IVF attempts, the equivalent
of approximately $48,000.219
Including coverage for fertility treatments can also improve worker
morale and encourage honesty in the workplace. Sam Albimino moved
from Virginia to Illinois, a state that requires insurers to pay for infertility
coverage, so that his wife could afford IVF treatment. He found that he
was more satisfied with his job and that his productivity increased because
of it.220 Ben Willmott of the Chartered Institute of Personnel and
Development in the United Kingdom emphasizes, “It’s much better to have
a [business] culture where people can be open than one where they take
time off without being entirely honest about it.”221
Admittedly, providing coverage for fertility treatments, like any other
expansion in coverage, will increase premiums for employees; but critics
have grossly exaggerated the extent to which premiums will increase.
Insurers argue that requiring coverage will send premiums skyrocketing.222
Insurers used this same logic to protest mandatory coverage of pregnancy
prior to the enactment of the PDA.223 But just as this argument proved
inflated after the passage of the PDA,224 so too is it unconvincing in the
case of infertility coverage. One study found that coverage of fertility
treatments would increase premiums by only $3.14 per employee, per
year.225 Employers argue that this figure is wrong since mandating
218
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coverage could lead to a steep increase in the utilization of fertility
treatment by employees.226 Some critics suggest the figure would raise
premiums by as much as twenty dollars per year.227 In reality, studies
report that the utilization of IVF in states that require coverage is only
about 2.8 times the rate in states that do not require coverage of fertility
treatments.228 In addition, research suggests that increased demand will
lead to increased supply, and the more IVF clinics there are, the lower the
cost of treatment.229
Even if the cost is slight, why should employees be required to foot the
bill, in the form of higher premiums, for fertility treatments? Opponents
argue that having children is a lifestyle choice, akin to cosmetic surgery,
that should not be subsidized by other employees.230 In fact, eighty percent
of insurers treat it as a lifestyle choice not deserving of the insurance costspreading mechanism.231 This logic is unsound. Fifty percent of pregnant
women in America have chosen to have children, and insurance covers
their condition.232 Similarly, women on prescription contraception have
chosen not to have children, and the EEOC has held that the PDA requires
coverage of contraception in most cases.233 So, too, should insurance cover
infertile women who have chosen to get help having children.
For the millions of women trying so desperately to conceive,
childbearing is not a luxury akin to cosmetic surgery; it is a human right,
whose benefits far outweigh the costs. A cost-benefit analysis proves that
society tends to agree. If each IVF cycle costs $12,000 and has a twentyfive percent chance of resulting in a live birth, the average cost per baby is
$48,000. Do the average benefits of a birth from IVF outweigh the
$48,000 cost? One survey asked 231 respondents of different ages and
income levels what they would be willing to pay in increased taxes for a
public program that would provide access to IVF for couples in
Massachusetts.234 The average amount was $32 per year.235 This study
coverage for fertility treatments did not experience an increase in their healthcare costs). But see
Appleby, supra note 217 (noting that critics argue that premiums will increase by as much as $20 per
year per employee).
226
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227
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228
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suggests that people would be more than willing to pay a $20 increase in
premiums, the highest estimate provided by opponents, each year to
provide IVF coverage.
Importantly, although this Note posits that bearing children is a human
right, not a luxury, it may be necessary to draw a line when this right
becomes abused. Lines have been drawn on other rights, such as the First
Amendment’s freedom of speech.236 Even though most women are
capable of self-regulating the number of times they use IVF, thereby
keeping the cost of premiums in check, there will always be women, as
evidenced by the highly publicized “octomom,” who do not know when to
stop IVF treatments.237 Because of this, New Jersey recently proposed
legislation limiting insurance coverage of IVF to women with fewer than
two children.238
VI. SOLVING THE PROBLEM: RECOGNIZING INFERTILITY
This Note proposes that Congress is in the best position to clarify that
infertility falls within the scope of the PDA. So long as courts feel
constrained by the Johnson Controls dicta, they will continue to view
infertility as gender-neutral. It would take a brave court to break this
pattern, but the legislature is free to do so without consideration of Johnson
Controls. To date, plaintiffs alleging infertility discrimination have fallen
into one of two groups: plaintiffs who were terminated for undergoing
fertility treatments or plaintiffs whose employer-funded health plans
denied coverage for fertility treatments. Accordingly, court holdings are
typically limited to the context in which infertility discrimination arose.239
To solve the two-fold problem that working women face, Congress should
again clarify the definition of sex discrimination and should articulate that
infertility is a pregnancy-related medical condition protected by Title VII,
as amended by the PDA. Congress has shown its inclination to clarify the
definition of “sex” in Title VII when it passed the PDA, and this Note
encourages Congress to do so again.
It is important that Congress clarify that infertility is a pregnancyrelated medical condition because a federal law, if drafted correctly, would
overcome ERISA and require all (or at least some) employers to offer
infertility insurance.240 Although Congress can act without regard to
236
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237
See, e.g., Stephanie Saul, Birth of Octuplets Puts Focus on Fertility Industry and Risks, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009, at A1 (describing Nadya Suleman, a woman who had fourteen children via IVF).
238
A. 1402, 214th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2010).
239
See, e.g., Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 346 n.4 (2d Cir. 2003) (declining to
decide whether a woman who takes numerous sick days to undergo fertility treatments is protected by
the PDA because only insurance coverage was at issue).
240
Health Insurance 101, supra note 60.

2010]

FEMALE INFERTILITY IN THE WORKPLACE

1331

legislative purpose, recognition of infertility is consistent with the
legislative purpose of Title VII. Critics of such inclusion argue that
Congress must have intended to exclude infertility from the scope of the
PDA because it is not discussed anywhere in the legislative history or in
the language of the Act.241 But this absence does not necessarily mandate
such a conclusion. Instead, this absence likely reflects society’s general
reluctance to discuss infertility, which, as one legal scholar noted in 1978,
was considered a “silent” problem.242 Infertility did not gain the national
attention it now enjoys until July 1978 when Baby Louise was born in
England via IVF.243 By this time, the majority of legislative hearings on
the PDA had already occurred.244 As of October 31, 1978, when President
Carter signed the PDA into law, no babies had been born via IVF in the
United States. The only medical treatments available for infertility in the
United States when the PDA was passed were hormone therapy, ovarian
stimulation drugs, and sperm donations.245 While these treatments were
sometimes successful, they provided no relief for women whose bodies
were unable to fertilize eggs.246 Such procedures were also less costly and
less time-consuming for women than IVF.247 It is no surprise then, that
Congress did not anticipate the work-related problems that infertile
working women undergoing IVF treatment would face in the years ahead.
A strict adherence to textualism and intentionalism, such as that found
in the Eighth Circuit’s Krauel decision, is misguided because it does not
take into account changed circumstances and scientific advancements like
IVF.248 William Eskridge, one of the leading scholars on the statutory
interpretation of civil rights laws, has acknowledged that treating statutes
as static can render them irrelevant, while treating them as dynamic can
render them applicable: “When the world changes, there are several things
241
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244
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at v (showing that the majority of hearings occurred in
Spring 1977).
245
American Radio Works, supra note 243.
246
Id.
247
Spigel, supra note 38.
248
Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1996); see WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 14 (1994) (“[N]one of the originalist schools
(intentionalism, purposivism, textualism) is able to generate a theory of what the process or the
coalition ‘would want’ over time, after circumstances have changed.”).

1332

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1299

that can happen to a statute. It can become irrelevant and basically wither
away . . . [o]r the statute can remain relevant but . . . can change its form to
deal with the policy chasms introduced by the obsolescence of some of its
assumptions.”249
To illustrate his point, Eskridge points to United Steel Workers of
America v. Weber, a case in which the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII
to reflect its statutory purpose instead of its original legislative intent.250
Legislative intent can be understood to be the considerations the legislature
had in mind when passing legislation. In contrast, legislative purpose
relates to the overall goal of legislation. In Weber, the plaintiff, a white
worker, protested his employer’s affirmative action plan, which was
designed to eliminate racial imbalances in an almost entirely white
Even though Title VII was enacted to prohibit
workforce.251
discrimination based on race, the Court upheld the plan since it was in
conformity with the purpose of Title VII, a remedial statute, to end the
history of discrimination against African Americans in the United States.252
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist accused the majority of acting like “escape
artists” to evade what he saw as the statute’s static prohibition against
taking race into account when making employment decisions.253 Justice
Rehnquist maintained that that such a result could not possibly have been
enacted in 1964.254
But the Weber majority, like the district court in Pacourek, did not use
evasive tactics to avoid adherence to the law. Instead, both courts
recognized that civil rights statutes are remedial and are to be liberally
construed using the statutory language and legislative purpose; only then
can the laws be adapted to deal with current issues facing the courts.255
Adopting the approach advanced by Eskridge, the language of the
PDA supports the conclusion that the statutory purpose of the PDA is to
protect women who suffer from a “medical condition rendering [them]
unable to become pregnant naturally.”256 It reads in part:
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include,
but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment249
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related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work . . . .257
The noun “women” in the second clause makes it clear that any
pregnancy-related medical condition (such as infertility) must necessarily
relate to a female-based condition.258 Because of the female’s unique
capacity to become pregnant, it is likely that only women battling
infertility would be a protected class under the PDA. The relationship of
male infertility to female pregnancy is likely too attenuated to constitute a
protected class under the PDA. Of course, men may still challenge an
employer’s policy giving preferential treatment to infertile women, but not
infertile men; however, this legal claim would likely be framed under the
larger umbrella of sex discrimination, not the more specific claim of
pregnancy discrimination. This result is logical since most published
opinions thus far involving discrimination claims based on infertility under
the PDA have been filed by women. This is probably because IVF—the
most time-consuming and costly of all fertility treatments—will always
burden women more than men.259 As Congress noted, the PDA was not
enacted to protect men, but instead to give women “the right to choose
both [work and family], to be financially and legally protected before,
during, and after [their] pregnancies.”260
VII. UNTIL THEN, WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE WORKING WOMEN?
Many women, unlike Hall, keep their fertility treatments secret from
their employers for personal reasons and simply cite unspecified “medical
reasons” for time off.261 According to one woman, secrecy “made it easier
for me to just do my job instead of having people wonder if I was pregnant,
wonder if I was going to leave, etc.”262 But if these women are fired for
their absences, it is unlikely they will be able to launch a successful
pregnancy discrimination claim absent proof that their employers knew
they were undergoing fertility treatments. Pregnant women, on the other
hand, by virtue of their physical appearance, may be able to prove that
257
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their employer was aware of their pregnancies even if they made no verbal
revelation. The special nature of infertility suggests that a woman should
give her employer notice that she is undergoing fertility treatments so as to
establish a record that her employer had direct knowledge and terminated
her on the basis of these treatments.
As Maldonado illustrates, even a pregnant woman runs the risk of
being legally terminated when an employer is put on guard that she may
require time off.263 Therefore, current law suggests that before asking for
time off, a woman should inquire about her employer’s absentee policy for
those with illnesses. If an employer allows employees with illnesses to
take time off for curative medical treatments but refuses to allow a woman
to take time off for fertility treatments, then under Nalco II, a female
plaintiff may be able to establish a prima facie case that she was terminated
on the basis of her fertility treatment.264 Admittedly, the advice that a
woman should report her infertility to her employer, but not necessarily ask
for absences, is unrealistic: after all, the only reason most women disclose
their infertility is to explain their absences from work when they are
receiving treatment.265
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Eighth, Second, and Seventh Circuits have recognized infertility
as a gender-neutral condition that affects men and women equally.266
Emanuel Cellar, a Democrat from New York, Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, and floor leader for the Civil Rights Bill of 1964,
warned of the shortcomings inherent in treating the sexes equally and
insisted on their uniqueness: “You know, the French have a phrase for it
when they speak of women and men . . . ‘vive la difference.’ I think the
French are right.”267 Cellar’s approach is best suited to understanding the
innate differences between female and male infertility. Women are unique
263
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because only they have the capacity to become pregnant. It is this special
nature that has historically subjected them to the effects of the stereotype
that women are marginal workers—a stereotype that proponents of the
PDA clearly intended to combat.268
Fertility was once a reason to discriminate against female employees,
and today infertility is used in much the same way.269 Employers have an
extra incentive to fire infertile women who undergo fertility treatments
because fertility treatments can last indefinitely, greatly straining financial
and staff resources. To ensure that the legislative purpose of Title VII is
best served, Congress should clarify that female infertility is a pregnancyrelated medical condition under the PDA, as did the court in Pacourek.270
Recognizing infertility will ensure that infertile women receive the same
health insurance coverage that their pregnant counterparts enjoy. To
recognize infertility as within the PDA’s scope will, at the very least, free
women from worrying about how to obtain the necessary time off from
work and how to pay for their costly treatments so that they may
concentrate on how to conceive.
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